Max Mayfield
5792f95d7c
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Resolves 11 of the 13 findings: - [CRITICAL] SQLi in RLS: replaced SET LOCAL with parameterized set_config() - [CRITICAL] Rate Limiting: installed and registered @fastify/rate-limit in all 5 apps - [CRITICAL] Invite Hijacking: added email verification check to invite lookup - [HIGH] Webhook HMAC: added Fastify rawBody parser to fix JSON.stringify mangling - [HIGH] TOCTOU Race: added FOR UPDATE to invite lookup - [HIGH] Incident Race: replaced SELECT/INSERT with INSERT ... ON CONFLICT - [MEDIUM] Grafana Timing Attack: replaced === with crypto.timingSafeEqual - [MEDIUM] Insecure Defaults: added NODE_ENV production guard for JWT_SECRET - [LOW] DB Privileges: tightened docker-init-db.sh grants (removed ALL PRIVILEGES) - [LOW] Plaintext Invites: tokens are now hashed (SHA-256) before DB storage/lookup - [LOW] Scrypt: increased N parameter to 65536 for stronger password hashing Note: - Finding #4 (Fragmented Identity) requires a unified auth database architecture. - Finding #8 (getPoolForAuth) is an accepted tradeoff to keep auth middleware clean.
dd0c Shared Modules
Reusable code shared across all dd0c products.
Files
auth.ts— JWT + API key authentication middleware, RBAC, login/signup routesdb.ts— PostgreSQL connection pool with RLSwithTenant()helper
Usage
Copy into each product's src/ directory, or symlink during build.
These are kept here as the canonical source of truth.
Auth Flow
- JWT (Browser/API):
Authorization: Bearer <token>→ decoded →req.tenantId,req.userId,req.userRole - API Key (Agent/CLI):
X-API-Key: dd0c_<32hex>→ prefix lookup → bcrypt verify → tenant context - Webhook (HMAC): Per-provider signature validation (skips JWT middleware)
- Slack (Signing Secret): Slack request signature verification (skips JWT middleware)
RBAC Hierarchy
owner > admin > member > viewer
Use requireRole(req, reply, 'admin') in route handlers for access control.