Elevate requirements to organizational/architectural policy

- Security: no IAM in service repos, no custom auth, no direct external calls
- Architecture: no cross-cloud SDKs, no cross-service DB access, no hardcoded tenant/env config
- DevOps: Foxtrot-compatible Helm (no custom ingress), no infra provisioning in service repos, no pinned infra versions
- Cost: resource tagging, no unbounded allocation, no per-tenant infra
- Updated checker and demo to match
- These are NOT static code analysis — they catch organizational policy violations that SonarQube/Checkstyle miss
This commit is contained in:
Max Mayfield
2026-03-07 07:41:27 +00:00
parent a7728c6266
commit e323c45cb0
10 changed files with 265 additions and 198 deletions

6
.demo/dependencies.txt Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
# ARCH-001 VIOLATION: Direct cloud SDK dependencies
com.amazonaws:aws-java-sdk-s3:1.12.400
com.google.cloud:google-cloud-storage:2.20.0
# SEC-002 VIOLATION: JWT library for custom auth
io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt:0.9.1

28
.demo/infra/main.tf Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
# SEC-001 VIOLATION: IAM resources in a service repo
resource "aws_iam_role" "service_role" {
name = "user-service-role"
assume_role_policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.assume.json
}
resource "aws_iam_policy" "s3_access" {
name = "user-service-s3-access"
policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"]
Resource = "arn:aws:s3:::reltio-prod-data/*"
}]
})
}
# OPS-002 VIOLATION: Infrastructure provisioning in service repo
resource "aws_sqs_queue" "user_events" {
name = "user-events-queue"
}
resource "aws_dynamodb_table" "user_cache" {
name = "user-cache"
billing_mode = "PAY_PER_REQUEST"
hash_key = "userId"
}

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@@ -11,4 +11,33 @@ spec:
image: reltio/user-service:latest
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
# OPS-003 VIOLATION: No resource limits defined
---
# OPS-001 VIOLATION: Custom ingress instead of Foxtrot routing
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: user-service-ingress
spec:
rules:
- host: users.reltio.com
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: user-service
port:
number: 8080
---
# OPS-004 VIOLATION: Pinned infrastructure version
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: user-db
spec:
template:
spec:
containers:
- name: postgres
image: postgres:14.2

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@@ -1,42 +1,48 @@
// Sample service with intentional violations for demo purposes
// Demo service with intentional violations at the organizational/architectural level
package com.reltio.demo;
import com.amazonaws.services.s3.AmazonS3; // ARCH-001 VIOLATION: Direct AWS SDK import
import com.google.cloud.storage.Storage; // ARCH-001 VIOLATION: Direct GCP SDK import
import io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts; // SEC-002 VIOLATION: Custom JWT handling
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*;
import org.springframework.web.client.RestTemplate;
// SEC-003 VIOLATION: Missing @ReltioSecured annotation
@RestController
@RequestMapping("/api/users")
public class UserController {
private final UserRepository repo;
private final AmazonS3 s3Client;
private final RestTemplate restTemplate;
public UserController(UserRepository repo) {
this.repo = repo;
// ARCH-003 VIOLATION: Hardcoded environment URL
private static final String ANALYTICS_URL = "https://prod.reltio.com/analytics/v1";
// ARCH-003 VIOLATION: Hardcoded tenant logic
public Object getTenantConfig(String tenantId) {
if (tenantId.equals("acme-corp")) {
return Map.of("maxEntities", 1000000);
}
return Map.of("maxEntities", 100000);
}
// SEC-001 VIOLATION: Raw request parameter access
// SEC-002 VIOLATION: SQL string concatenation
@GetMapping("/search")
public List<User> search(HttpServletRequest request) {
String name = request.getParameter("name");
return repo.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'");
// SEC-003 VIOLATION: Direct external HTTP call
public void notifyPartner(String event) {
restTemplate.postForObject("https://api.partner-system.com/webhook", event, String.class);
}
// COMPLIANT: Validated input, parameterized query, auth annotation
@ReltioSecured(resource = "users", privilege = "READ")
@GetMapping("/{id}")
public User getById(@PathVariable @Valid Long id) {
return repo.findById(id);
// SEC-002 VIOLATION: Custom auth endpoint
@PostMapping("/login")
public String login(@RequestBody LoginRequest req) {
// Custom JWT generation instead of using platform auth
return Jwts.builder().setSubject(req.getUsername()).compact();
}
// SEC-004 VIOLATION: Hardcoded secret
private static final String API_SECRET = "sk-reltio-prod-a8f3b2c1d4e5f6789";
// OPS-002 VIOLATION: Raw stdout logging
@PostMapping
@ReltioSecured(resource = "users", privilege = "WRITE")
public User create(@RequestBody @Valid CreateUserRequest req) {
System.out.println("Creating user: " + req.getName());
return repo.save(req.toUser());
// ARCH-002 VIOLATION: Cross-service database query
public List<Order> getUserOrders(Long userId) {
// Directly querying the orders service's schema
return jdbcTemplate.query(
"SELECT * FROM orders_service.orders WHERE user_id = ?",
new Object[]{userId}, orderRowMapper);
}
}

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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-- OPS-004 VIOLATION: Destructive migration
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN legacy_name;
ALTER TABLE users RENAME COLUMN full_name TO display_name;
-- COMPLIANT: Additive migration
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN email VARCHAR(255);
CREATE INDEX idx_users_email ON users(email);