5 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Max Mayfield	5792f95d7c	Fix BMad adversarial security review findings ... Resolves 11 of the 13 findings: - [CRITICAL] SQLi in RLS: replaced SET LOCAL with parameterized set_config() - [CRITICAL] Rate Limiting: installed and registered @fastify/rate-limit in all 5 apps - [CRITICAL] Invite Hijacking: added email verification check to invite lookup - [HIGH] Webhook HMAC: added Fastify rawBody parser to fix JSON.stringify mangling - [HIGH] TOCTOU Race: added FOR UPDATE to invite lookup - [HIGH] Incident Race: replaced SELECT/INSERT with INSERT ... ON CONFLICT - [MEDIUM] Grafana Timing Attack: replaced === with crypto.timingSafeEqual - [MEDIUM] Insecure Defaults: added NODE_ENV production guard for JWT_SECRET - [LOW] DB Privileges: tightened docker-init-db.sh grants (removed ALL PRIVILEGES) - [LOW] Plaintext Invites: tokens are now hashed (SHA-256) before DB storage/lookup - [LOW] Scrypt: increased N parameter to 65536 for stronger password hashing Note: - Finding #4 (Fragmented Identity) requires a unified auth database architecture. - Finding #8 (getPoolForAuth) is an accepted tradeoff to keep auth middleware clean.	2026-03-03 00:14:39 +00:00
Max Mayfield	eb953cdea5	Security hardening: auth encapsulation, pool restriction, rate limiting, invites, async webhooks ... Phase 1 (Security Critical): - Auth plugin encapsulation: replaced global addHook with Fastify plugin scope - Removed startsWith URL matching; public routes registered outside auth scope - JWT verify now enforces algorithms: ['HS256'] (prevents algorithm confusion) - Raw pool no longer exported from db.ts; systemQuery() + getPoolForAuth() instead - withTenant() remains primary tenant-scoped query path Phase 2 (Infrastructure): - docker-compose.yml: all secrets via env var substitution (${VAR:-default}) - Per-service Postgres users (dd0c_drift, dd0c_alert, etc.) in docker-init-db.sh - .env.example with all configurable secrets - build-push.sh uses $REGISTRY_PASSWORD instead of hardcoded - .gitignore excludes .env files - @fastify/rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 5/min login, 3/min signup - CORS_ORIGIN default changed from '*' to 'http://localhost:5173' Phase 3 (Product): - Team invite flow: tenant_invites table, POST /invite, GET /invites, DELETE /invites/:id - Signup accepts optional invite_token to join existing tenant - Async webhook ingestion (P3): LPUSH to Redis, BRPOP worker, dead-letter queue Console: - All 5 product modules wired: drift, alert, portal, cost, run - PageHeader accepts children prop - 71 modules, 70KB gzipped production build All 6 projects compile clean (tsc --noEmit).	2026-03-02 23:53:55 +00:00
Max Mayfield	be3f37cfdd	Fix CRITICAL auth bypass: exact match for login/signup paths ... startsWith('/api/v1/auth/login') allowed any path with that prefix to bypass authentication (e.g. /api/v1/auth/login-anything). Changed to exact path match with query string stripping. Fixed across all 5 products + shared/auth.ts.	2026-03-02 20:35:28 +00:00
Max Mayfield	5ee869b9d8	Implement auth: login/signup (scrypt), API key generation, shared migration ... - Login: email + password lookup, scrypt verify, JWT token - Signup: create tenant + owner user in transaction, slug generation - API key: dd0c_ prefix, SHA-256 hash (not bcrypt — faster for API key lookups), prefix index - Scrypt over bcrypt: zero native deps, Node.js built-in crypto - Auth routes skip JWT middleware (login/signup are public) - 002_auth.sql: users + api_keys tables with RLS, copied to all products - Synced auth middleware to P3/P4/P5/P6	2026-03-01 03:19:18 +00:00
Max Mayfield	762e2db9df	Add shared auth middleware (JWT + API key + RBAC) and canonical withTenant() helper	2026-03-01 03:09:01 +00:00