4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Max	f1f4dee7ab	feat(cost): add zombie hunter, Slack interactions, composite scoring ... - Zombie resource hunter: detects idle EC2/RDS/EBS/EIP/NAT resources - Slack interactive handler: acknowledge, snooze, create-ticket actions - Composite anomaly scorer: Z-Score + rate-of-change + pattern + novelty - Cold-start fast path for new resources (<7 days data) - 005_zombies.sql migration	2026-03-03 06:39:20 +00:00
Max Mayfield	5792f95d7c	Fix BMad adversarial security review findings ... Resolves 11 of the 13 findings: - [CRITICAL] SQLi in RLS: replaced SET LOCAL with parameterized set_config() - [CRITICAL] Rate Limiting: installed and registered @fastify/rate-limit in all 5 apps - [CRITICAL] Invite Hijacking: added email verification check to invite lookup - [HIGH] Webhook HMAC: added Fastify rawBody parser to fix JSON.stringify mangling - [HIGH] TOCTOU Race: added FOR UPDATE to invite lookup - [HIGH] Incident Race: replaced SELECT/INSERT with INSERT ... ON CONFLICT - [MEDIUM] Grafana Timing Attack: replaced === with crypto.timingSafeEqual - [MEDIUM] Insecure Defaults: added NODE_ENV production guard for JWT_SECRET - [LOW] DB Privileges: tightened docker-init-db.sh grants (removed ALL PRIVILEGES) - [LOW] Plaintext Invites: tokens are now hashed (SHA-256) before DB storage/lookup - [LOW] Scrypt: increased N parameter to 65536 for stronger password hashing Note: - Finding #4 (Fragmented Identity) requires a unified auth database architecture. - Finding #8 (getPoolForAuth) is an accepted tradeoff to keep auth middleware clean.	2026-03-03 00:14:39 +00:00
Max Mayfield	eb953cdea5	Security hardening: auth encapsulation, pool restriction, rate limiting, invites, async webhooks ... Phase 1 (Security Critical): - Auth plugin encapsulation: replaced global addHook with Fastify plugin scope - Removed startsWith URL matching; public routes registered outside auth scope - JWT verify now enforces algorithms: ['HS256'] (prevents algorithm confusion) - Raw pool no longer exported from db.ts; systemQuery() + getPoolForAuth() instead - withTenant() remains primary tenant-scoped query path Phase 2 (Infrastructure): - docker-compose.yml: all secrets via env var substitution (${VAR:-default}) - Per-service Postgres users (dd0c_drift, dd0c_alert, etc.) in docker-init-db.sh - .env.example with all configurable secrets - build-push.sh uses $REGISTRY_PASSWORD instead of hardcoded - .gitignore excludes .env files - @fastify/rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 5/min login, 3/min signup - CORS_ORIGIN default changed from '*' to 'http://localhost:5173' Phase 3 (Product): - Team invite flow: tenant_invites table, POST /invite, GET /invites, DELETE /invites/:id - Signup accepts optional invite_token to join existing tenant - Async webhook ingestion (P3): LPUSH to Redis, BRPOP worker, dead-letter queue Console: - All 5 product modules wired: drift, alert, portal, cost, run - PageHeader accepts children prop - 71 modules, 70KB gzipped production build All 6 projects compile clean (tsc --noEmit).	2026-03-02 23:53:55 +00:00
Max Mayfield	6f692fc5ef	Scaffold dd0c/cost: Welford baseline, anomaly scorer, governance engine, tests ... - Welford online algorithm for running mean/stddev baselines - Anomaly scorer: z-score → 0-100 mapping, property-based tests (10K runs, fast-check) - Governance engine: 14-day auto-promotion with FP rate gate, injectable Clock - Panic mode: defaults to active (safe) when Redis unreachable - Tests: 12 scorer cases (incl 2x 10K property-based), 9 governance cases, 3 panic mode cases - PostgreSQL schema with RLS: baselines (optimistic locking), anomalies, remediation_actions - Fly.io config, Dockerfile	2026-03-01 02:52:53 +00:00