Security hardening: auth encapsulation, pool restriction, rate limiting, invites, async webhooks
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CI — P2 Drift (Go + Node) / agent (push) Successful in 43s
CI — P2 Drift (Go + Node) / saas (push) Failing after 5s
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CI — P4 Portal / test (push) Failing after 4s
CI — P5 Cost / test (push) Failing after 4s
CI — P6 Run / saas (push) Failing after 5s
CI — P2 Drift (Go + Node) / build-push (push) Failing after 7s
CI — P3 Alert / build-push (push) Has been skipped
CI — P4 Portal / build-push (push) Has been skipped
CI — P5 Cost / build-push (push) Has been skipped
CI — P6 Run / build-push (push) Failing after 5s
Phase 1 (Security Critical):
- Auth plugin encapsulation: replaced global addHook with Fastify plugin scope
- Removed startsWith URL matching; public routes registered outside auth scope
- JWT verify now enforces algorithms: ['HS256'] (prevents algorithm confusion)
- Raw pool no longer exported from db.ts; systemQuery() + getPoolForAuth() instead
- withTenant() remains primary tenant-scoped query path
Phase 2 (Infrastructure):
- docker-compose.yml: all secrets via env var substitution (${VAR:-default})
- Per-service Postgres users (dd0c_drift, dd0c_alert, etc.) in docker-init-db.sh
- .env.example with all configurable secrets
- build-push.sh uses $REGISTRY_PASSWORD instead of hardcoded
- .gitignore excludes .env files
- @fastify/rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 5/min login, 3/min signup
- CORS_ORIGIN default changed from '*' to 'http://localhost:5173'
Phase 3 (Product):
- Team invite flow: tenant_invites table, POST /invite, GET /invites, DELETE /invites/:id
- Signup accepts optional invite_token to join existing tenant
- Async webhook ingestion (P3): LPUSH to Redis, BRPOP worker, dead-letter queue
Console:
- All 5 product modules wired: drift, alert, portal, cost, run
- PageHeader accepts children prop
- 71 modules, 70KB gzipped production build
All 6 projects compile clean (tsc --noEmit).
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products/05-aws-cost-anomaly/migrations/003_invites.sql
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products/05-aws-cost-anomaly/migrations/003_invites.sql
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenant_invites (
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
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tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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email TEXT NOT NULL,
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role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'member' CHECK (role IN ('admin', 'member', 'viewer')),
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token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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invited_by UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
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expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW() + INTERVAL '7 days',
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accepted_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
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);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tenant_invites_token ON tenant_invites(token);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tenant_invites_email ON tenant_invites(email);
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