Flesh out dd0c/cost: ingestion with Welford optimistic locking, anomaly API, governance, baselines
- Ingestion API: batch cost events, Welford baseline update with optimistic locking (version column), anomaly detection inline
- Anomaly API: list (filtered), acknowledge, snooze (1-168h), mark expected, dashboard summary with hourly trend
- Governance API: mode status, promotion eligibility check with FP rate calculation
- Baseline API: list with computed stddev, reset per resource
- Data layer: withTenant() RLS wrapper, Zod config with ANOMALY_THRESHOLD
- Fastify server entry point
2026-03-01 03:07:02 +00:00
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import Fastify from 'fastify';
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import cors from '@fastify/cors';
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import pino from 'pino';
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import { config } from './config/index.js';
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Security hardening: auth encapsulation, pool restriction, rate limiting, invites, async webhooks
Phase 1 (Security Critical):
- Auth plugin encapsulation: replaced global addHook with Fastify plugin scope
- Removed startsWith URL matching; public routes registered outside auth scope
- JWT verify now enforces algorithms: ['HS256'] (prevents algorithm confusion)
- Raw pool no longer exported from db.ts; systemQuery() + getPoolForAuth() instead
- withTenant() remains primary tenant-scoped query path
Phase 2 (Infrastructure):
- docker-compose.yml: all secrets via env var substitution (${VAR:-default})
- Per-service Postgres users (dd0c_drift, dd0c_alert, etc.) in docker-init-db.sh
- .env.example with all configurable secrets
- build-push.sh uses $REGISTRY_PASSWORD instead of hardcoded
- .gitignore excludes .env files
- @fastify/rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 5/min login, 3/min signup
- CORS_ORIGIN default changed from '*' to 'http://localhost:5173'
Phase 3 (Product):
- Team invite flow: tenant_invites table, POST /invite, GET /invites, DELETE /invites/:id
- Signup accepts optional invite_token to join existing tenant
- Async webhook ingestion (P3): LPUSH to Redis, BRPOP worker, dead-letter queue
Console:
- All 5 product modules wired: drift, alert, portal, cost, run
- PageHeader accepts children prop
- 71 modules, 70KB gzipped production build
All 6 projects compile clean (tsc --noEmit).
2026-03-02 23:53:55 +00:00
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import { getPoolForAuth } from './data/db.js';
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import { authHook, decorateAuth, registerAuthRoutes, registerProtectedAuthRoutes } from './auth/middleware.js';
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Flesh out dd0c/cost: ingestion with Welford optimistic locking, anomaly API, governance, baselines
- Ingestion API: batch cost events, Welford baseline update with optimistic locking (version column), anomaly detection inline
- Anomaly API: list (filtered), acknowledge, snooze (1-168h), mark expected, dashboard summary with hourly trend
- Governance API: mode status, promotion eligibility check with FP rate calculation
- Baseline API: list with computed stddev, reset per resource
- Data layer: withTenant() RLS wrapper, Zod config with ANOMALY_THRESHOLD
- Fastify server entry point
2026-03-01 03:07:02 +00:00
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import { registerAnomalyRoutes } from './api/anomalies.js';
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import { registerBaselineRoutes } from './api/baselines.js';
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import { registerGovernanceRoutes } from './api/governance.js';
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import { registerIngestionRoutes } from './api/ingestion.js';
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const logger = pino({ name: 'dd0c-cost', level: config.LOG_LEVEL });
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const app = Fastify({ logger: true });
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await app.register(cors, { origin: config.CORS_ORIGIN });
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Security hardening: auth encapsulation, pool restriction, rate limiting, invites, async webhooks
Phase 1 (Security Critical):
- Auth plugin encapsulation: replaced global addHook with Fastify plugin scope
- Removed startsWith URL matching; public routes registered outside auth scope
- JWT verify now enforces algorithms: ['HS256'] (prevents algorithm confusion)
- Raw pool no longer exported from db.ts; systemQuery() + getPoolForAuth() instead
- withTenant() remains primary tenant-scoped query path
Phase 2 (Infrastructure):
- docker-compose.yml: all secrets via env var substitution (${VAR:-default})
- Per-service Postgres users (dd0c_drift, dd0c_alert, etc.) in docker-init-db.sh
- .env.example with all configurable secrets
- build-push.sh uses $REGISTRY_PASSWORD instead of hardcoded
- .gitignore excludes .env files
- @fastify/rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 5/min login, 3/min signup
- CORS_ORIGIN default changed from '*' to 'http://localhost:5173'
Phase 3 (Product):
- Team invite flow: tenant_invites table, POST /invite, GET /invites, DELETE /invites/:id
- Signup accepts optional invite_token to join existing tenant
- Async webhook ingestion (P3): LPUSH to Redis, BRPOP worker, dead-letter queue
Console:
- All 5 product modules wired: drift, alert, portal, cost, run
- PageHeader accepts children prop
- 71 modules, 70KB gzipped production build
All 6 projects compile clean (tsc --noEmit).
2026-03-02 23:53:55 +00:00
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const pool = getPoolForAuth();
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decorateAuth(app);
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2026-03-01 03:10:35 +00:00
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Security hardening: auth encapsulation, pool restriction, rate limiting, invites, async webhooks
Phase 1 (Security Critical):
- Auth plugin encapsulation: replaced global addHook with Fastify plugin scope
- Removed startsWith URL matching; public routes registered outside auth scope
- JWT verify now enforces algorithms: ['HS256'] (prevents algorithm confusion)
- Raw pool no longer exported from db.ts; systemQuery() + getPoolForAuth() instead
- withTenant() remains primary tenant-scoped query path
Phase 2 (Infrastructure):
- docker-compose.yml: all secrets via env var substitution (${VAR:-default})
- Per-service Postgres users (dd0c_drift, dd0c_alert, etc.) in docker-init-db.sh
- .env.example with all configurable secrets
- build-push.sh uses $REGISTRY_PASSWORD instead of hardcoded
- .gitignore excludes .env files
- @fastify/rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 5/min login, 3/min signup
- CORS_ORIGIN default changed from '*' to 'http://localhost:5173'
Phase 3 (Product):
- Team invite flow: tenant_invites table, POST /invite, GET /invites, DELETE /invites/:id
- Signup accepts optional invite_token to join existing tenant
- Async webhook ingestion (P3): LPUSH to Redis, BRPOP worker, dead-letter queue
Console:
- All 5 product modules wired: drift, alert, portal, cost, run
- PageHeader accepts children prop
- 71 modules, 70KB gzipped production build
All 6 projects compile clean (tsc --noEmit).
2026-03-02 23:53:55 +00:00
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// Public routes (no auth)
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app.get('/health', async () => ({ status: 'ok', service: 'dd0c-cost' }));
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2026-03-02 13:53:15 +00:00
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app.get('/version', async () => ({ version: process.env.BUILD_SHA || 'dev', built: process.env.BUILD_TIME || 'unknown' }));
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Flesh out dd0c/cost: ingestion with Welford optimistic locking, anomaly API, governance, baselines
- Ingestion API: batch cost events, Welford baseline update with optimistic locking (version column), anomaly detection inline
- Anomaly API: list (filtered), acknowledge, snooze (1-168h), mark expected, dashboard summary with hourly trend
- Governance API: mode status, promotion eligibility check with FP rate calculation
- Baseline API: list with computed stddev, reset per resource
- Data layer: withTenant() RLS wrapper, Zod config with ANOMALY_THRESHOLD
- Fastify server entry point
2026-03-01 03:07:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Security hardening: auth encapsulation, pool restriction, rate limiting, invites, async webhooks
Phase 1 (Security Critical):
- Auth plugin encapsulation: replaced global addHook with Fastify plugin scope
- Removed startsWith URL matching; public routes registered outside auth scope
- JWT verify now enforces algorithms: ['HS256'] (prevents algorithm confusion)
- Raw pool no longer exported from db.ts; systemQuery() + getPoolForAuth() instead
- withTenant() remains primary tenant-scoped query path
Phase 2 (Infrastructure):
- docker-compose.yml: all secrets via env var substitution (${VAR:-default})
- Per-service Postgres users (dd0c_drift, dd0c_alert, etc.) in docker-init-db.sh
- .env.example with all configurable secrets
- build-push.sh uses $REGISTRY_PASSWORD instead of hardcoded
- .gitignore excludes .env files
- @fastify/rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 5/min login, 3/min signup
- CORS_ORIGIN default changed from '*' to 'http://localhost:5173'
Phase 3 (Product):
- Team invite flow: tenant_invites table, POST /invite, GET /invites, DELETE /invites/:id
- Signup accepts optional invite_token to join existing tenant
- Async webhook ingestion (P3): LPUSH to Redis, BRPOP worker, dead-letter queue
Console:
- All 5 product modules wired: drift, alert, portal, cost, run
- PageHeader accepts children prop
- 71 modules, 70KB gzipped production build
All 6 projects compile clean (tsc --noEmit).
2026-03-02 23:53:55 +00:00
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// Auth routes (public - login/signup)
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2026-03-01 03:10:35 +00:00
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registerAuthRoutes(app, config.JWT_SECRET, pool);
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Security hardening: auth encapsulation, pool restriction, rate limiting, invites, async webhooks
Phase 1 (Security Critical):
- Auth plugin encapsulation: replaced global addHook with Fastify plugin scope
- Removed startsWith URL matching; public routes registered outside auth scope
- JWT verify now enforces algorithms: ['HS256'] (prevents algorithm confusion)
- Raw pool no longer exported from db.ts; systemQuery() + getPoolForAuth() instead
- withTenant() remains primary tenant-scoped query path
Phase 2 (Infrastructure):
- docker-compose.yml: all secrets via env var substitution (${VAR:-default})
- Per-service Postgres users (dd0c_drift, dd0c_alert, etc.) in docker-init-db.sh
- .env.example with all configurable secrets
- build-push.sh uses $REGISTRY_PASSWORD instead of hardcoded
- .gitignore excludes .env files
- @fastify/rate-limit: 100 req/min global, 5/min login, 3/min signup
- CORS_ORIGIN default changed from '*' to 'http://localhost:5173'
Phase 3 (Product):
- Team invite flow: tenant_invites table, POST /invite, GET /invites, DELETE /invites/:id
- Signup accepts optional invite_token to join existing tenant
- Async webhook ingestion (P3): LPUSH to Redis, BRPOP worker, dead-letter queue
Console:
- All 5 product modules wired: drift, alert, portal, cost, run
- PageHeader accepts children prop
- 71 modules, 70KB gzipped production build
All 6 projects compile clean (tsc --noEmit).
2026-03-02 23:53:55 +00:00
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// Protected routes (auth required)
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app.register(async function protectedRoutes(protectedApp) {
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protectedApp.addHook('onRequest', authHook(config.JWT_SECRET, pool));
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registerProtectedAuthRoutes(protectedApp, config.JWT_SECRET, pool);
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registerIngestionRoutes(protectedApp);
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registerAnomalyRoutes(protectedApp);
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registerBaselineRoutes(protectedApp);
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registerGovernanceRoutes(protectedApp);
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});
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Flesh out dd0c/cost: ingestion with Welford optimistic locking, anomaly API, governance, baselines
- Ingestion API: batch cost events, Welford baseline update with optimistic locking (version column), anomaly detection inline
- Anomaly API: list (filtered), acknowledge, snooze (1-168h), mark expected, dashboard summary with hourly trend
- Governance API: mode status, promotion eligibility check with FP rate calculation
- Baseline API: list with computed stddev, reset per resource
- Data layer: withTenant() RLS wrapper, Zod config with ANOMALY_THRESHOLD
- Fastify server entry point
2026-03-01 03:07:02 +00:00
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try {
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await app.listen({ port: config.PORT, host: '0.0.0.0' });
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logger.info({ port: config.PORT }, 'dd0c/cost started');
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} catch (err) {
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logger.fatal(err, 'Failed to start');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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